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I. THE STATUS OF ARTS IN FEDERALISM –
REFORM IN GERMANY
1. The trend to unitary federation
German federalism is changing rapidly. It has neverbeen a “dual federalism”, like for example in theUnited States of America, except during the times
of monarchy from 1871-1919. Instead, it has always been
– more or less – a “functional federalism.” The legislative
power rests predominantly with the federal level, the
greater portion of administrative functions with the Länder
(states). In this sense it is an “executive federalism.” The
Länder participate in federal legislation by a “Federal
Council” (Bundesrat). Soon after the Basic Law, the
Constitution of the Federal Republic, was adopted in
1949, Germany became increasingly a “unitary
federalism” in the sense that the federal level gained
considerably more weight, even excess weight, in setting
political directives, shaping the format of living conditions,
and in formal and informal coordination of the states.
Identity of the people was more a national one rather than
Länder-based. The next step was “cooperative federalism.”
This term might be considered a pleonasm, because a
federation always and anywhere forces federal level and
state level into cooperative action. In Germany it means,
however, that the Federal Government and Länder
developed “joint tasks” with joint planning and ﬁnancing,
and moved more and more towards a “network of politics”
which was lacking transparency and very often led to a
“joint decision trap.” Using the “power of the purse”
Federal Government guided the Länder with the “golden
harness.”
2. Reasons for centralization – need for diversity
One may well detect three main reasons for the drift to
the centre:
• Firstly, the improvement of economy and living
conditions led to the current social- and welfare state,
which was and is in favour of equality, measured against
a nation-wide yardstick.
• Secondly, the accelerated development of the European
Common Market (and later the European Union) led
to transformation of the Länder as states into mere
regions of an enlarged area. The Länder, in the process
of integration, clearly lost competences and authority
to the national and European levels.
• Finally, the uniﬁcation of Germany after 1990 caused
the urgent need to equalize, or at least approximate,
economy and social conditions in all parts of the
country, east and west. This huge and very costly task
could be managed by the centre only.
On the other hand, many politicians and economists
have agreed for a long time that more competition,
pluralism and diversity are needed in the country and that
federalism does provide all instruments for achieving this.
Since public budgets dry up, no Land is really willing to pay
for equalization subsidies for federal partners who fall back
in competition. Finally it is true that the midwifes of the
Federal Republic, the Allies – namely the United States
and the United Kingdom – in designing the new federation
in 1947/48 wanted primarily decentralization. Ethnical
differentiation, creativeness and ﬂexibility of the
constituent parts of the nation in social, economic and
cultural matters were preferable; centralism was to be
avoided.
3. Amendments to the constitution – a history
There have been some 50 amendments to the German
Constitution. Three of the major ones – 1968, 1969, 1994
– dealt, among other issues, with federalism. In 2003 a
Joint Commission of the Federal Diet and the Federal
Council was established to design a major reform of
federalism, both in the political and ﬁnancial segments of
the Basic Law. In 2004 – at the dawn of the Socialist-
Ecologist Coalition of Chancellor Schroeder – the
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Commission failed to ﬁnd a ﬁnal consensus on a minor
question of Higher Education Competences of the
Federation. Some say: a voluntary breakage! The
Commission resumed its work after the Great Coalition of
Conservatives and Socialists was formed in 2005 and has
now ﬁnished one part of the work: the federalism reform
excluding ﬁnancial matters. Parliament approved the
amendments in 2006. By the end of this year another
Commission of Diet and Council – the same shape as the
ﬁrst one – received the mandate to prepare a draft of the
ﬁnancial reform. Whether the coalition will work until
2009, and develop sufﬁcient strength to ﬁnalise its task,
remains uncertain. Certainly the ﬁnancial issues are even
more tricky than the portion which has been
accomplished.
II. WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED?
4. The main issues of the 2006 Amendment
The main issues of the ﬁrst phase of the federalism
reform, which became law in July 2005, are the following
ones:
• redistributing the legislative powers of both levels:
federal and Länder;
• reducing the number of legislative areas where the
Federal Diet needs the consent of the Federal Council
to pass a law;
• reducing the number of “joint tasks” of Federal and
Länder levels;
• empowering the Federal Republic to act in European
Union matters.
Bringing the ﬁrst three issues into focus, the main idea
of the reform was to improve transparency of
responsibilities in federal and Länder matters, in other
words: to make clear cuts and avoid mergers of authority.
This task has been sufﬁciently accomplished. There is no
longer – as critics said – a system of “organized lack of
responsibilities.”
5. Opposition from the Federal Council benches
Prior to the amendments of 2006 far more than 50 per
cent of draft laws, which had passed the Federal Diet to
become law, required the consent of the Federal Council,
which is the representation of the Länder governments.
The reason was, in most cases, that the Federal Law
contained provisions for administrative procedures.
Administering laws, be they federal or Länder laws, are in
most areas within the responsibility of Länder
administration (“executive federalism”). Fewer and fewer
draft laws, as enacted by the Federal Diet (as the “First
House”), remained subject to objection by the Federal
Council (the “Second House”), which can be rejected or
overruled by the Diet with a qualiﬁed majority. If the
majority of Länder governments – as being represented in
the Council – were of a different colour to the majority of
the Diet – in “opposition” so to speak – it was easy to
obstruct Diet majority and Federal Government from the
Council bench by simply not consenting to drafts. This is
exactly what happened, often enough to be regarded as a
standard strategy.
This knot was untied by redistributing legislative
competences between federal and Länder levels, mostly in
favour of the latter. For compensation purposes, the
consent areas have been reduced signiﬁcantly. In addition,
a new mechanism was introduced: Länder who disagree
with the draft, but cannot stop it any longer by not
consenting, are entitled to deviate from the federal law, as
enacted, by Länder legislation.
6. Joint Federal/Länder responsibilities
Furthermore – and equally important – the amendment
reduced the number of joint Federal/Länder
responsibilities (“joint tasks”). Joint tasks cover joint
planning and ﬁnancing (50/50), and apply for example
when building higher education facilities, improving
regional economic structures, and undertaking coastal
preservation. Introduced by the amendment of 1969, they
were the result of a lascivious offer by the (then) rich
Federal level to assist and support the Länder in doing their
job. In the meantime, the climate and the power of the
purse have changed, and the Länder competences with
respect to Higher Education and culture were returned to
the Länder by the reform.
7. Federal and Länder level in European Union
matters
A third and vital objective of the reform was to
strengthen the interstate Federal and Länder organization
and procedures for acting in European Union affairs. The
Länder wanted to have a say in supranational regulation
dealing with matters which, according to the national
constitution, fall into their authority. They wanted to
participate in the European decision-making process,
which is negotiated mainly by national governments, in the
case of Germany consequently by Federal Ministers.
Nowadays, in the European Council of Ministers, the
highest European body in Brussels, the Federal Republic
can be represented by a member of the government of one
Land, as designated by the Federal Council. This applies to
matters which traditionally fall into Länder responsibility,
such as (higher) education, science, culture and
broadcasting. Whether this marks the ﬁnal development of
the process is open to discussion. It means, however, using
the emergency brake versus Federal Government and Diet,
which – in the course of integration – transferred Länder
responsibilities to European authorities without taking care
of proper Länder participation.14
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8. Other amendments
Minor amendments made by the reform of 2006
address the role of Berlin as the capital of the Federal
Republic and smaller issues of ﬁnancial harmonization
between Federal and Länder levels. Long desired is the fair
provision that, according to the principle of connectivity of
tasks and ﬁnancial burden sharing, the Federal government
cannot transfer public tasks to municipalities and countries
without offering sufﬁcient budgets.
9. First evaluation
If one wants to balance the accounts of the ﬁrst phase of
the reform, one may ﬁnd positive results:
• There is a good deal more transparency of
responsibilities; the proﬁles of Federal and Länder
authorities are drawn more sharply;
• Länder are less tempted to obstruct Federal
Government politics from Federal Council benches:
• The old truism that the music is chosen by him who
pays has been underlined.
III. WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE?
10. A basket of open topics
This positive balance reﬂects the completion of only half
the task – if not less. The reform of the ﬁnancial part of the
Basic Law is missing. By the end of 2006 the coalition
succeeded in installing a (second) Joint Commission of
Diet and Council to prepare the ground. The guideline for
negotiations is an annex to the amendment of July 2006.
This “open collection of topics” covers some nine points
which are very general and even vague, and do not provide
guidelines for the decision-making process.
The Financial Constitution is, by nature, an accessory
adjunct constitution to the political part. In other
words, its purpose is to stabilise the division of
competences from a funding perspective. The guideline
for solving this problem is easy. Paragraph 104a of the
Basic Law says: “The Federation and the Länder shall
separately ﬁnance the expenditures resulting from the
discharge of their respective responsibilities, insofar as
this Basic Law does not otherwise provide.” But when it
comes to detail, one has to admit that the ﬁnancial
constitution of the Land, including the tax-related parts,
is deﬁnitely one of the most complicated in the world of
federations, probably the most complicated. Experts
have confessed that they are unable to comprehend the
system in its entirety. One could assume that some 25
per cent of legal literature worldwide is written in the
German language. However, when it comes to ﬁnance
and tax law related material, about 60 per cent of all
literature is in German. The 1994 Commission to draft
constitutional amendments stopped short of designing a
new ﬁnancial section, and so did the commission of
2003. Nevertheless, the main issues facing the
Commission can be brieﬂy summarized, namely the
revenue system, equalization and public debt.
11. Raising and spending taxes
Currently, the country has a mixed system of revenue
collection and distribution. Fiscal law is predominantly
Federal law. The Federal level collects most of the money.
The Länder receive most of their budgets as part of the
centrally collected money according to constitutional and
statutory provisions. The Länder want – and, one has to
admit, need –more autonomy on the tax-income side.
They want to raise their own taxes, and to have structural
options for their budget. They want, for example, the
constitutional right to introduce a surcharge or a discount
on a tax. They require the right to set the tax rate on the
income-tax share accruing to them. It is obvious that
remodelling the revenue system in this form would
encourage competition.
12. Equalization
But this would have – on the other hand – serious
consequences for the current system of ﬁnancial
equalization. Germany is – next to Switzerland – the only
federation in the world where equalization of the economic
and ﬁnancial capacity of the federal units is made by
horizontal distribution, not by allocation of funds from the
centre. Currently, the yardstick of equalization is to provide
for equivalent – if not homogenous – living conditions for
citizens in all Länder. Well-to-do Länder – like Bavaria and
Hessen – have to support the other ones, some of which
are close to bankruptcy. In some cases everybody would
accept this fact voluntarily. This is true, for example, for
the ﬁve Länder, which formerly comprised the German
Democratic Republic and have to shoulder tremendous
ﬁscal burdens. In other cases, the “giving” Länder do not
fully agree with the philosophy, practice and budget-
discipline which the “taking” Länder apply in doing their
job. The current system of equalization, in other words,
does not favour competitive federalism.
13. Public debt
A third problem is the deplorable situation of public
budgets, namely the increase of debt. For some years the
debt-ratio of the Federal budget far exceeded the
European ceiling of 3 per cent of GNP – which is
binding on the Member States! And neither the Federal
nor most Länder budgets observe Paragraph 115 Basic
Law which states that “revenue obtained by borrowing
shall not exceed the total of investment expenditures
provided for in the budget.” I shall use the ﬁnancial
situation of Berlin as an example. The capital city – a
City State – is ﬁscally in a critical situation after the
amalgamation of two former capital cities: Berlin-West
and Berlin-East. This everybody will admit. Berlin’s
annual budget consists of roughly €20 billion. The total
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debt of Berlin amounts to €55 billion. Interest consumes
14 per cent of the budget – €25 billion per year, €11
million per day. Berlin ﬁled a suit before the Federal
Constitutional court for subsidies from the Federation
and the Länder according to the federal solidarity
principle, but the court held in 2006 that there is no
constitutional basis for this claim and that every Land, in
principle, is responsible for its ﬁscal policy.
14. New Länder borders?
Many difﬁculties which contribute to the current ﬁscal
situation point to the need for a new delineation of Länder
borders. Why does the country need 16 Länder – some of
them (like Bremen and Saarland) with a population of less
than one million? Why does one need 16 Länder
parliaments and governments? The idea is to amalgamate,
from 16 down to six or so. There have been – and are –
several expert opinions. Some years ago the attempt to
merge Berlin and the belt-Land Brandenburg failed in a
plebiscite. Needless to say, Germany shares this problem
with other federations.
15. Perspectives of the fiscal reform
For approaching competitive federalism
The next steps of constitutional reform are crucial for
the approaching competitive federalism. On March 8,
2007 the work of Hercules began. The Second Joint
Commission of the federal Diet and the Federal Council –
under a fresh double chair – held its constituent session to
deal with the main issues of the ﬁnancial reform of the
Federal System. Hopefully this timely start will encourage
politicians to carry on, as the reform process has lost some
drive. The government is getting close to the ﬁrst half of its
term and other urgent reforms (the health system,
unemployment, education) take priority.
The Commission will need – even more than the ﬁrst one
– support, advice and comparison from outside sources, with
other federations providing the beneﬁt of their history and
practice. For, as the Founding Fathers of the United States,
in drafting the constitution, said: “Let us be guided by
experience, because reason might mislead us!”
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